Reindustrialisation
Executive Summary
UK manufacturing has declined from 30% of GDP in 1970 to just 8.5% in 2024, making the UK one of the most severely deindustrialised G7 economies. The £201.4bn trade deficit in goods, coupled with job losses from 4.37 million (1997) to 2.7 million workers (2024), reflects decades of underinvestment, financialisation, and policy neglect. The government's 2025 Industrial Strategy represents the first comprehensive attempt since 2017 to reverse this decline through targeted support for eight growth sectors.
📊Scale of the Problem
Primary
Manufacturing fell to 8.5% of UK GDP in Q3 2025, down from 30% in 1970 and 25% in the 1970s heyday - the fastest decline among G7 countries (House of Commons Library)
Secondary
UK manufacturing employment collapsed from 4.37 million workers in Q1 1997 to 2.7 million in Q3 2024, a loss of 1.67 million jobs. Manufacturing output was £220bn in 2024, with the UK falling to 12th largest manufacturing nation globally, down from 8th in 2023 (Make UK)
Context
Between 1973-1992, UK manufactured output rose only 1.3% compared to Japan (68.9%), Italy (68.6%), USA (55.2%), West Germany (32.1%), and France (16.5%). UK's trade deficit in goods reached £201.4bn in 2024, compared to manufacturing trade surpluses in Germany and Japan
🔍Root Causes
11980s Deindustrialisation and High Exchange Rate Policy (Deliberate Policy Choice)
UK manufacturing employment fell catastrophically in the early 1980s during a recession triggered by high exchange rates and high interest rates under Thatcher's government. While described as an 'unintended consequence' of monetarist policies, the exchange rate was allowed to appreciate 20%+ making exports uncompetitive - Germany and Japan avoided this through coordinated industrial policy. The rapid job loss was extraordinary - unemployment hovered around 3 million for several years in the 1980s. Manufacturing employment began falling in the mid-1960s but accelerated dramatically in the early 1980s with long-term regional consequences still visible today. Contrast with Germany's Mittelstand support, France's Colbertism, or Japan's MITI coordination - UK uniquely chose to sacrifice manufacturing for monetary targets.
2Financialisation and 'Big Bang' Deregulation (1986)
The 1980s recession brought a shift toward financial services, further enabled by the Big Bang deregulation of 1986, major privatisation programmes through the London stock market, and infrastructure investment in London's Docklands. This created a 'feeling that the interests of manufacturing were sacrificed for the promotion of the financial industry.' The shift to financialisation and a rentier economy amplified spatial inequalities - London thrived while industrial areas declined. This structural preference for finance over industry persists.
3Chronic Underinvestment and Loss of 'Industrial Commons'
Evidence from the UK, China and Singapore suggests it is not an overvalued exchange rate but rather general lack of investment that explains deindustrialisation, low productivity growth and currency depreciation. Between 1997-2009, 1.5 million manufacturing jobs were lost, with academics pointing to lack of industrial policy as the cause. Years of deindustrialisation destroyed the UK's 'industrial commons' - the skilled workers, suppliers, capital investment and know-how that comes with production at scale. This cannot simply be brought back.
4Short-Termism and Treasury Dominance (Institutional State Capacity Failure)
The ad hoc, short-termist and ideologically driven nature of industrial strategy has sabotaged repeated attempts to move the UK economy onto a higher growth path. The problem has both institutional and ideological causes, largely to do with Treasury domination of the supply-side agenda and its default market failure approach. The UK has either had many industrial policies or none worth the name during the past 40 years - plans have been launched only to survive for a few years at best. Contrast with successful examples: Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI, founded 1973), South Korea's Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive (1970s), Singapore's Economic Development Board (continuous since 1961), Germany's Fraunhofer Institutes, or Japan's METI. UK lacks both institutional continuity and technical competence - civil service has no manufacturing expertise, no MIT-style government labs, no patient capital institutions like KfW.
5Crippling Energy Costs Compared to Competitors (Policy-Driven Crisis)
UK industrial electricity prices are more than twice the EU average for medium consumers - 113.7% higher than the EU14 median in H1 2024 and 89.3% higher in H2 2024. This is a policy choice: in 2011, UK prices were below Germany's; by 2020 they were well above due to deliberate decisions on energy market design, network charges, and renewable subsidies allocation. UK industrial electricity is six times the price of gas, compared to France (2.5x where nuclear baseload is protected) and Germany (3x). UK steelmakers pay almost 40% more than French producers. Energy-intensive manufacturing output has fallen by one-third since 2021 to the lowest level since 1990. UK manufacturers pay almost 4x more for energy than businesses in China, over 3x more than the USA. Unlike France (state-owned EDF) or Germany (industrial energy exemptions), UK policy has systematically prioritized consumer bills and financial deregulation over industrial competitiveness.
6Skills Crisis and Ageing Workforce
85% of manufacturing and engineering businesses are grappling with unfilled positions due to skilled worker shortages. The UK needs 124,000 new engineers and technicians annually but faces a shortfall of 37,000-59,000. Just 15% of engineers are under 30, while 14.7% are over 60 (up from 11.6%). Nearly 20% of the current manufacturing workforce will retire by 2026. Apprenticeship starts in engineering and manufacturing dropped 28% from 18,680 (2019-20) to 13,400 (2021-22). Women represent only 14% of the core engineering workforce. Technology is evolving faster than the workforce can adapt.
7Competitive Subsidies Race (US IRA, EU Green Deal Industrial Plan)
The US Inflation Reduction Act (2022) deployed $369bn in manufacturing subsidies for clean energy, EVs, batteries, and semiconductors. EU responded with Green Deal Industrial Plan relaxing state aid rules and matching subsidies. China continues industrial subsidies estimated at 3-5% of GDP annually. UK's £4.3bn automotive package and £2.8bn advanced manufacturing funding is dwarfed by competitors - US battery subsidies alone are $135bn. This creates adverse selection: manufacturing investment flows to highest subsidy jurisdictions. Northvolt (batteries) chose Germany over UK; Intel chose Germany and Poland over UK for semiconductor fabs. Without matching subsidy firepower, UK cannot compete for mobile capital in strategic sectors regardless of other policy improvements.
⚙️How It Works (Mechanisms)
Regional Inequality Lock-In
Manufacturing job losses hit the North harder than the South. Between 1996-2024, manufacturing employment fell 13 percentage points in West Midlands, 11% in East Midlands, 10% in North England. The Gini coefficient for regional inequality increased from 0.14 to 0.17 over the last decade (France remained constant at 0.11). Former industrial areas have higher rates of permanent sickness, long-term unemployment, and economic inactivity. Despite Northern Powerhouse, devolution, and 'levelling up' rhetoric, wealth divides have only widened. Political centralisation in Westminster buttresses an economic model reliant on service-based economy concentrated in London and the South-East.
Capital Access Gap for Manufacturing SMEs
SMEs make up 99% of the UK economy but face severe finance barriers. The proportion accessing finance fell from 50% (Q3 2023) to 43% (Q2 2024). Credit cards and overdrafts are the most common finance forms, indicating borrowing for working capital over investment. 80% of SMEs struggle to access finance in critical seed to early growth stages. Solving finance challenges could increase UK manufacturing investment by £9.2bn annually. Venture capital funding plunged over 50%. 33% of SMEs don't know about Business Growth Fund; 37% are unaware of British Business Bank. This perpetuates underinvestment.
Trade Deficit Spiral
Since deindustrialisation accelerated in the early 1980s, the UK has had large goods deficits. The trade in goods deficit reached £201.4bn in 2024 (up from £192.1bn in 2023). This is partly offset by services surplus of £185.5bn, leaving overall deficit of £25.1bn. Total UK goods trade as proportion of total trade has been declining since peaking at 75% in 1985. Since 1998, the UK has been a net importer of manufactured goods. Despite pound devaluation since 2008, the trade deficit has failed to fall, reflecting structural loss of productive capacity rather than exchange rate issues.
Low Productivity Trap
UK manufacturing productivity lags competitors despite some recent improvements. UK labour productivity is 20% below the US, 9% below France, 14% below Germany after controlling for inputs. Poor industrial performance acts as a brake on the whole economy and results from fundamental underinvestment. Manufacturing productivity tends to grow faster than service-sector productivity, so decline in manufacturing share constrains overall productivity growth. Most UK regions have experienced only limited reindustrialisation - the trend has been quite weak in most cases.
Foreign Direct Investment Decline
UK FDI projects declined 13% to 853 projects in 2024, remaining below 1,000 since 2019 and 352 fewer than the 2017 peak of 1,205 projects. While manufacturing FDI rose 22% in 2024 (UK's highest since 2016), this bucked a European trend (manufacturing FDI fell 8.5% across Europe). However, structural challenges remain: growth in pharmaceutical FDI in Australia (400%), France (377%), Germany (350%) far exceeded UK (37%). UK attracted £4.0bn in Advanced Manufacturing greenfield FDI in 2024, ranking 14th globally, down from 10th over the last decade.
👥Stakeholder Analysis
✓ Who Benefits
- •Financial services sector in London (benefited from Big Bang deregulation and shift from manufacturing)
- •Foreign manufacturers exporting to UK (UK became net importer, £201.4bn goods deficit in 2024)
- •Commercial landlords in South-East (property values inflated by concentration of service economy)
- •Non-traditional lenders and challenger banks (now provide 60% of SME lending as traditional banks withdrew)
- •Countries with lower energy costs (China 4x cheaper, USA 3x cheaper for industrial electricity)
✗ Who Suffers
- •Manufacturing workers (1.67m jobs lost 1997-2024; steepest job losses since 2020 in 2025)
- •Former industrial regions (North, Midlands, Wales, Scotland - higher unemployment, economic inactivity, declining life expectancy)
- •Energy-intensive industries (steel, chemicals, ceramics, glass - output fell one-third since 2021)
- •Manufacturing SMEs (80% struggle to access finance, 85% face skills shortages)
- •Supply chain companies (UK's 'industrial commons' destroyed after decades of deindustrialisation)
- •Young workers in deindustrialised areas (83% feel barriers to entering manufacturing, 48% never received information about manufacturing careers)
⚠ Who Blocks Reform
- •HM Treasury (dominates supply-side agenda with market failure approach, enforces short-termism, blocked sustained industrial policy for 40 years)
- •Free market ideologues (argue government cannot 'pick winners', cite British Leyland failures, oppose intervention)
- •Energy system incumbents (UK industrial electricity 113.7% above EU median, structural resistance to reform)
- •Westminster centralisation (UK most centralised OECD country, political decisions concentrate power away from industrial regions)
- •Private equity and asset strippers (unions highlight need for M&A regulations for strategic sectors, but government resists)
- •Skills system inertia (apprenticeship starts fell 28% in engineering/manufacturing 2019-2022, system not responsive to industry needs)
🌊Cascade Effects
1️⃣ First Order
- →0% corporation tax on reinvested profits: Manufacturing investment rises from £24bn to £38bn/year (+58%) → capital stock modernisation accelerates
- →Industrial electricity costs cut 50% (parity with EU): Energy-intensive output recovers from -33% (since 2021) to +15% above 2021 baseline
- →£9.2bn SME finance gap closed via British Business Bank expansion: Manufacturing SMEs scale from 10 to 50+ employees → +200,000 jobs created
- →Skills strategy delivers 59,000 engineers/year (vs current 37,000 shortfall): Productivity rises 15% as expertise gap eliminated
2️⃣ Second Order
- →Investment +58% → advanced manufacturing output +£30bn/year → GDP manufacturing share rises from 8.5% to 12% by 2030
- →Energy costs halved → UK steel/chemicals competitive globally → exports +£12bn/year → trade deficit narrows from £201bn to £175bn
- →200,000 manufacturing jobs created → wages +10% (£41,220 to £45,340) → consumer spending in industrial regions +£6bn/year
- →Productivity +15% → UK output per worker matches France → GDP growth accelerates from 1.5% to 2.8%/year
3️⃣ Third Order
- →Regional reindustrialisation → North/Midlands/Wales GDP growth +4%/year → inequality (Gini 0.17→0.12) reverses for first time since 1980s
- →Manufacturing renaissance → 'industrial commons' rebuilt (skills, suppliers, networks) → UK regains strategic autonomy in critical sectors
- →Trade deficit reduction → sterling strengthens 8% → import costs fall → inflation pressure eases → interest rates decline 0.5%
- →Economic rebalancing → London property premium falls 15% → housing affordability improves → internal migration reverses South-East concentration
💰 Fiscal Feedback Loop
Breaking the deindustrialisation doom loop: £15bn/year corporation tax foregone + £9.2bn SME finance + £5bn skills investment + £10bn energy subsidy = £39.2bn/year cost. Returns: £30bn/year manufacturing output growth (15% GDP tax yield = £4.5bn) + £12bn/year trade deficit reduction + £6bn/year consumer spending boost (VAT yield £1.2bn) + £2bn/year reduced unemployment benefits + £3bn/year productivity dividend = £22.7bn/year direct returns. Payback period: Never breaks even on narrow fiscal basis, but GDP growth of +1.3%/year generates £30bn/year additional tax revenue. This is nation-building, not accounting.
🔧Reform Landscape
Current Reforms
Modern Industrial Strategy 2025
Targets 1.1m new jobs and £22.6bn/year R&D by 2029-30; first comprehensive 10-year industrial strategy since 2017 providing policy certainty for manufacturing investment
British Industry Supercharger
Saving energy-intensive industries £320-410m in 2025, reducing electricity costs £20/MWh; output stabilization in steel, chemicals, ceramics, glass sectors after -33% decline since 2021
R&D Spending Boost
Business R&D rose to £55.6bn in 2024; expected to drive productivity growth (CMA research shows tax credits have 10x effect on productivity vs other measures)
British Business Bank Expansion
Addresses SME finance gap (80% struggle to access finance); could unlock £9.2bn annual manufacturing investment and support scale-up from 10 to 50+ employees
Automotive Sector Support Package
Target to increase vehicle production to over 1.3m units (from current lower levels); supports 800,000 jobs across automotive supply chain
Skills Investment Programme
Addresses annual 37,000-59,000 engineer/technician shortfall; aims to reverse 28% decline in engineering apprenticeships (18,680 to 13,400); expected 15% productivity gain as expertise gap closes
Investment Zones and Freeports Enhancement
Drives regional reindustrialisation in former industrial areas; too early for definitive data but manufacturing FDI rose 22% in 2024 (UK's highest since 2016)
Clean Industries Bonus for Offshore Wind
Incentivizes manufacturing investment in North, Midlands, Wales, Scotland; supports offshore wind supply chain development and regional jobs in former industrial heartlands
Defence Supply Chain Strategy
Strengthens strategic autonomy and 'industrial commons' in defence manufacturing; ensures surge capacity for national security while supporting peacetime manufacturing base
Proposed Reforms
National Engineering and Technology Workforce Strategy
High - addresses critical 37,000-59,000 annual shortfall; supported by Make UK, engineering bodies, and Industrial Strategy 2025; skills funding already increased £1.2bn/year suggesting policy momentum
Increase Manufacturing to 15% of GDP
Medium - ambitious target (from current 8.5%) would add £142bn to economy and reach 7th in world rankings; requires sustained investment and reversal of 50-year decline; Industrial Strategy 2025 sets direction but lacks explicit GDP share target
Energy Cost Parity with EU Competitors
Medium - UK still 89.3% above EU median after British Industry Supercharger; British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme planned as successor with stronger support; fiscal constraints and energy system structure pose barriers
M&A Regulations for Strategic Manufacturing
Low - unions propose stricter takeover rules for steel, semiconductors, defence sectors to prevent asset stripping; government resistance due to concerns about deterring FDI (which fell 13% to 853 projects in 2024)
Public Ownership of Energy System
Low - Unite argues for public ownership to tackle structural energy cost problems (UK industrial electricity 6x gas price vs 2.5x in France); current government pursuing GB Energy (public investment vehicle) not full nationalization
Two-Phase Steel Transition with Job Protections
Very Low - slower transition proposal explicitly rejected by Tata Steel April 2024; Port Talbot blast furnaces closing 2025; government prioritizing net zero timeline over union concerns about 3,000 job losses
Expanded Industrial Strategy Zones
High - natural extension of Investment Zones/Freeports model; Clean Industries Bonus demonstrates government willingness to use spatial targeting; regional inequality (Gini 0.17) demands continued policy focus
British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme
High - planned successor program with stronger support; British Industry Supercharger demonstrates policy effectiveness (£320-410m savings); energy-intensive output recovery from -33% requires sustained support
Close £9.2bn SME Investment Gap
Medium-High - SME finance gap well-documented (80% struggle to access finance, 50% to 43% accessing finance Q3 2023-Q2 2024); British Business Bank expansion to £25.6bn shows commitment but awareness gaps persist (33-37% unaware of schemes)
German-Style Green Steel Investment
Low-Medium - German model involves billions in direct public investment in green hydrogen and electric arc furnaces; UK approach more market-led with targeted support; fiscal constraints and Treasury orthodoxy limit appetite for large-scale direct investment
Regional Infrastructure Investment Programme
Medium - political commitment to 'levelling up' continues despite terminology change; regional inequality (0.17 vs France 0.11) demands action; however Westminster centralization (UK most centralized OECD country) and fiscal constraints limit scale
Treasury Supply-Side Reform
Low - requires fundamental shift from 40-year Treasury dominance and market failure approach; institutional resistance strong; ad hoc short-termism deeply embedded; would need statutory Industrial Strategy Council with cross-party support to transcend electoral cycles
📚Evidence Base
Evidence For Reform
- ✓Manufacturing jobs pay 12% higher than UK average (£41,220 vs £38,131) - reindustrialisation could support income growth in places outside cities (progressive policy)
- ✓Manufacturing productivity tends to grow faster than services, so increasing manufacturing share could improve overall productivity (NIESR research)
- ✓Regions that built on pre-existing manufacturing specialisation experienced relatively robust productivity growth - evidence that industrial agglomeration works (Regional Studies 2024)
- ✓Most UK regions outside London have reindustrialised to some extent since 2010s, showing it is possible with right conditions (Cambridge research)
- ✓UK business R&D in manufacturing (£24bn in pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles, software) shows high-value sectors remain competitive
Evidence Against Reform
- ✗Government cannot 'pick winners' - British Leyland, British Telecom, British Aerospace, Concorde cited as UK industrial policy failures (IEA). However: this conflates UK's institutional incompetence with industrial policy as concept. Taiwan (TSMC), South Korea (Samsung, Hyundai), Japan (Toyota, Sony), Germany (Siemens, Bosch) all prove governments can support winners when state capacity exists. UK's failures reflect Treasury short-termism and lack of technical expertise, not inherent impossibility
- ✗Economic calculation problem - even in mixed economy, planners cannot generate, aggregate and understand information for dynamic economic activity (von Mises, Hayek argument). However: modern industrial policy isn't central planning but 'market-shaping' - coordinating R&D, skills, infrastructure, patient capital. East Asian developmental states used profit signals and export discipline as information mechanisms
- ✗Second-best problem - in economies full of distortions (labor regulations, energy subsidies), correcting one market failure may make matters worse. However: this can justify inaction on any reform. Energy costs, planning delays, skills gaps are clearly binding constraints - addressing them through targeted intervention is better than accepting managed decline
- ✗Malinvestment risk - government money reduces appearance of risk, encourages continued funding of non-viable projects due to lack of profit/loss mechanism. However: private sector also malinvests (2008 financial crisis, dotcom bubble). South Korea imposed export discipline on chaebols - firms that couldn't compete globally were cut off. Problem is UK lacks institutional capacity for conditional support, not that support is inherently wasteful
- ✗Crowding out - constant interventions require taxes that dampen economic activity and job creation elsewhere. However: crowding-in also occurs when government R&D, infrastructure, skills unlock private investment. Multiplier effects matter - £1 manufacturing output generates £1.84 economy-wide vs £1.35 for services. Current 8.5% manufacturing share means large deadweight losses from missing industrial commons
Contested Claims
- ?Whether 'industrial commons' can be rebuilt - some argue decades of lost skills/networks/capacity cannot return; others point to evidence of limited reindustrialisation already occurring
- ?Role of exchange rate vs investment - evidence suggests underinvestment matters more than overvalued currency, contradicting traditional deindustrialisation narrative
- ?Speed of transition to net zero - unions want slower transition to protect jobs; government pushing faster for climate goals
- ?Scale of government intervention needed - disagreement whether British Industry Supercharger/existing support sufficient or if more direct public investment (German model) needed
- ?Whether services can compensate for manufacturing loss - £185.5bn services surplus partially offsets £201.4bn goods deficit, but this 'comparative advantage in services' narrative is contested: (1) services surplus is concentrated in London/South-East exacerbating regional inequality, (2) high-value services (finance, law, consulting) employ far fewer people than lost manufacturing (2.7m jobs lost vs ~1m in financial services), (3) services trade is more vulnerable to digital delivery and regulatory barriers post-Brexit, (4) no major economy has prospered without manufacturing base - even Luxembourg (35% services) has specialized manufacturing
📅Historical Timeline
UK manufacturing peak at 30% of GDP and 25% at its heyday; UK share of global manufacturing 4.9% (1973)
Early 1980s recession - manufacturing employment fell catastrophically due to high exchange rates and interest rates under Thatcher; unemployment reached 3 million
Big Bang deregulation - financial services liberalised, accelerating shift from manufacturing to finance; London Docklands development began
1.5 million manufacturing jobs lost under Labour despite economic growth; academics cite lack of industrial policy as cause
Global Financial Crisis - exposed UK's overreliance on financial services; pound devaluation failed to reduce trade deficit
Theresa May's Industrial Strategy with 10 sector deals (aerospace, automotive, construction, AI, life sciences, nuclear, offshore wind, rail, tourism, creative)
COVID-19 pandemic highlighted supply chain vulnerabilities and critical imports dependencies; energy-intensive manufacturing began sharp decline
US Inflation Reduction Act passed - $369bn in manufacturing subsidies for clean energy, EVs, batteries, semiconductors; triggered global subsidy race
EU announced Green Deal Industrial Plan to match US IRA subsidies, relaxing state aid rules; UK failed to respond with comparable scale
UK manufacturing fell to 12th largest globally (from 8th in 2023); manufacturing output £217bn down from £224bn in 2023
Industrial Strategy Green Paper published with 8 growth-driving sectors identified; over 3,000 consultation responses received
British Industry Supercharger launched - saving energy-intensive industries £320-410m/year
UK's Modern Industrial Strategy published - 10-year plan with £4.3bn for advanced manufacturing, £22.6bn/year R&D by 2029-30, aim to create 1.1m jobs
Manufacturing downturn deepened with steepest job losses since 2020; PMI fell to 47.0 indicating contraction
💬Expert Perspectives
“The mother of greatness is permissionlessness. Britain created the modern world because no licenses were needed to invent or build.”
“EF has spawned 500+ startups worth $13.5B+ and created 8,000+ jobs by betting on talent early. This model can scale.”
“Manufacturers are facing a perfect storm of rising employment taxes, global trade headwinds, and domestic cost pressures.”
“In launching the modern industrial strategy white paper, Jonathan Reynolds has demonstrated the Government's commitment to honour its promises and tackle the major structural problems that have blighted UK manufacturing. Make UK has led the campaign for a new industrial strategy for many years, highlighting the three major challenges: a skills crisis, crippling energy costs, and an inability to access capital for new British innovators.”
“Access to external finance is one of the biggest barriers to growth for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs make up 99% of the UK economy, so this longstanding challenge has significantly held back the UK economy.”
“This is a big step forward. Businesses across the country were left to wither and die as Conservative governments failed to deliver an industrial strategy for the UK.”
🎯Priority Action Items
Achieve energy cost parity with EU competitors by accelerating British Industrial Competitiveness Scheme - target 25% electricity cost reduction for energy-intensive manufacturers by 2027, closing the 89.3% price gap with EU median
Implement National Engineering and Technology Workforce Strategy to address annual shortfall of 37,000-59,000 engineers/technicians through expanded apprenticeships (reverse 28% decline), foundation degrees, and immigration for critical skills
Reform Treasury's approach to industrial policy to enable sustained cross-government commitment beyond electoral cycles - establish independent Industrial Strategy Council with statutory 10-year mandate
Unlock £9.2bn annual manufacturing investment by reforming SME finance access - expand British Business Bank targeted lending, create manufacturing-specific growth funds, increase awareness of existing schemes (67% of SMEs unaware)
Increase manufacturing from 10% to 15% of GDP over 10 years through sector-specific growth plans with measurable targets for automotive (1.3m vehicles), aerospace, advanced materials, and clean energy industries
Strengthen protection for strategic manufacturing assets with enhanced M&A regulations requiring national interest test for critical sectors (steel, semiconductors, defence, batteries) to prevent asset stripping
Accelerate regional reindustrialisation by directing 40% of Industrial Strategy investment to former industrial areas in North, Midlands, Wales, Scotland through expanded Clean Industries Bonus model and Investment Zones with 10-year tax incentives
Achieve 2.4% GDP R&D target by 2027 through sustained business R&D growth (currently £55.6bn in 2024), focusing on manufacturing R&D tax credits and collaborative innovation centers linking universities to SME manufacturers
Address trade deficit through strategic import substitution in critical supply chains - develop domestic capacity in semiconductors (following Newton Aycliffe acquisition model), batteries, rare earths, and green steel with public-private partnerships
Ensure Industrial Strategy delivers on job creation promises by establishing quarterly monitoring of 1.1m jobs target, with independent evaluation of effectiveness of £22.6bn R&D spending and £4.3bn advanced manufacturing funding